









The South African nuclear fuel industry: 
history and prospects 
Thomas Auf der Heyde 
Energy for Development Research Centre 
Energy Research Institute 
Un1versity of Cape Town 
Priv:lte Bag Rondebosch 7700 
Octobe r 1993 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
South Africa possesses the major stages in the nuclear fuel chain, from extraction 
of uranium, through conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication, to a nuclear 
power station and a waste repository. Most of these processes are controlled by 
the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), except for uranium mining, which falls 
under the auspices of the Nuclear Fuels Corporation of the Chamber of Mines, 
and the Koeberg power station, which is owned and operated by Eskom. In the 
past, the AEC constituted an essential pillar in the Nationalist government's siege 
economy: it was considered vital to both energy security and military supremacy. 
As a result, the nuclear establishment received generous state subsidies that 
peaked at R705m, or 92% of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs budget 
in 1987/8. 
The largest share of government funds to the AEC has been used to finance the 
operation of the Nuclear Fuel Production (NFP) division, which operates the 
conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication plants at Pelindaba and Valindaba, 
as well as the Vaalputs waste repository. Of all the NFP services, only the 
operation at Vaalputs is breaking even, with a turnover of about R3-4m/yr. The 
AEC's own figures reveal that the average production costs at the conversion, 
enrichment (Z), and fabrication (Beva) plants during the period 1988-92 were 
between ten and twenty times the spot market price during the same period, and 
this excludes the capital costs of the various plants. The most inefficient and 
expensive of these processes is the enrichment plant, which requires operating 
expenditure in the order of R343m / yr with an income of only R67 million. The 
AEC itself has acknowledged that the Z-plant can never be operated commer-
cially. Arguments as to why the Z-plant should not be closed forthwith are weak, 
and appear self serving. 
Since 1988, the AEC has been supplying nuclear fuel services to Eskom at prices 
that are between two and four times higher than the spot market prices. This has 
meant that Eskom has subsidised the AEC to the tune of at least R220m over the 
period 1988 to 1992. The reasons for this strange procurement policy are not clear. 
The Nuclear Fuels Corporation (Nufcor) has similarly been obtaining far higher 
prices for uranium delivered locally, presumably to Eskom, than it has for its 
exported product. Again, it is not clear what induced Eskom to contract with 
Nufcor for uranium it could have obtained at much lower prices elsewhere. 
The AEC is hoping to become a one-stop nuclear fuel supplier. This intention runs 
counter to the historical trend in the nuclear fuel market away from one-stop 
suppliers to traders and brokers. As it is, the global market is overtraded, with 
prices at all-time lows, large overcapacity and uncertain future demand. The 
chances of the AEC establishing itself as a reliable, cheap supplier in this market 
are small, because at present it cannot offer meaningful volumes nor competitive 
prices. In the long-term, the AEC is pinning its hopes on a new enrichment 
technology called MUS. The AEC believes that the new technique can serve as 
the platform for the AEC's continued functioning in the nuclear fuel market. It is 
investing about R40m / yr on MUS R&D, and claims a number of major break-
throughs. However, it is almost impossible to weigh these claims against results 
achieved elsewhere, since all institutions researching the MUS or related AVLIS 
process guard against information being released, for commercial reasons. It 
seems implausible, though , that the AEC is succeeding where other nuclear 
corporations with much larger budgets and far more advanced scientific and 
technological infrastructures are failing to make significant progress. In the US, 
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for example, the A VLIS program is being severely curtailed, after an investment 
of more than one billion dollars to date. 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the NfP division presents a major drain on 
the country's resources. Because of its astronomical production costs, the AEC 
will never be able to market products from its present operations at competitive 
prices on the global fuel market. On a macro-level , the situation at present is that 
the NfP division is being subsidised by the state to the tune of almost R300m/yr, 
while generating about RlOm income from export contracts, and about RSOm/yr 
from contracts with Eskom. 
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Chapter One 
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CHAIN IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The nuclear fuel chain is based on the utilisation of uranium, which occurs 
naturally as a mixture of the uranium-235 and uranium-238 isotopes (235u and 
238u, written as U235 and U238, respectively, for the remainder of this report). Of 
these two isotopes, it is U235 which serves as the fuel for a nuclear power station 
(NPS). Natural uranium is mined, and calcined to uranium oxide (UJ08, written 
as U308 for the remainder of this report). The solid U308 is then converted to 
gaseous Uf-6, the feedstock for the subsequent enrichment step, during which the 
amount of U235 is increased from its natural abundance of 0.7% to between 3 and 
4.5% for use in a NPS. Thereafter, the enriched uranium is fabricated into fuel 
pellets, which are contained in metal rods bundled together into fuel assemblies. 
After use in a NPS, the spent fuel is removed and stored on site for up to ten years, 
in order to reduce the amount of radioactivity and to cool the spent fuel to about 
300 degrees centigrade prior to further handling. In principle, the spent fuel may 
be reprocessed to extract plutonium and unused U235. In practice, however, most 
countries are storing their spent fuel pending a solution to the problem of safe. 
long-term disposal. 
In South Africa, uranium is produced as a by-product of gold- the last primary 
uranium mine having closed in 1984- and is then marketed through the Nuclear 
Fuels Corporation (Nufcor), which is part of the Chamber of Mines. Most of this 
uranium is exported as the oxide, but some is sold locally to Eskom and the 
Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), and since 1992 Nufcor has also been export-
ing small amounts of both natural and enriched UF6. Conversion, enrichment, 
and fabrication processes take place at the AEC's Pelindaba complex west of 
Pretoria, while disposal occurs at its Vaalputs site near Springbok in the north-
western Cape. Eskom owns and operates the NPS at Koeberg, outside Cape 
Town, and contracts both Nufcor and the AEC for some of its fuel requirements. 
To this point, all spent fuel from Koeberg has been stored on site, and Eskom has 
not yet revealed its disposal plans. However, all other nuclear waste has been 
disposed of at Vaalputs. The Council for Nuclear Safety is responsible for licens-
ing all nuclear transactions and processes, and for overseeing adherence to 
regulations governing the industry. However, the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and international safeguards agreements are administered by the AEC. 
A short historical overview of nuclear development in SA follows, but a more 
detailed chronology is included as an appendix . South Africa's nuclear involve-
ment began in the 1940s, when the country was asked by the Allies to investigate 
uranium deposits with a view to supplying the Manhattan atomic bomb project 
with uranium. By 1950, SA agreed to supply all its uranium product to the US 
and UK for weapons purposes. and in 1952 the first full-scale uranium extraction 
plant was opened. In 1967 Nufcor was established when the state ceded all 
uranium resources back to the private owners. The SA nuclear industry formally 
came into being with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Board (AEB) on 1 
January 1949, and in 1961 the AEB occupied its present site at Pelindaba. Apart 
from lobbying for the establishment of a local nuclear power program, the AEB 
was also involved in operating the country's SAFARI research reactor, and in 
conducting research into enrichment techniques. In 1969 the Cabinet approved 
funds for a pilot enrichment plant (the so-called Y-plant). A year later the 
development of an indigenous new enrichment process was announced, and the 
Uranium Enrichment Corporation (Ucor) was form ed. Construction of the Y-
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plant began in 1971 , although it was apparently commissioned only seven years 
later. Apart from a halt in production between 1979 and 1981 , operation continued 
until 1989. By 1974 the i\EB's brief had been expanded into supplying military 
technology, when the Prime Minister 's ad hoc committee decided to construct 
nuclear weapons using enriched uranium from theY-plant, and in 1977 the AEB 
was issued with instructions to meet Eskom's future fuel requirements. 
The AEB commenced construction of both its present conversion plant and the 
'semi-commercial' enrichment (Z-) plant in 1979, and a year later also started 
work on the fuel fabrication (BEVA = Brandstof Element Vervaardigings Aanleg) 
plant. first production from the conversion plant occured in 1986, while the Z-
and BEVA plants began production in 1988; in the case of the Z-plant problems 
were experienced during the commissioning process which stretched over a 
number of years. The last link in the chain was put in place when the Vaalputs 
waste repository became functional in 1986, and in the same year the AEC 
announced plans for a nuclear research facility near the Gouritz river mouth in 
the southern Cape. At the time it was widely speculated that this facility was to 
be a reprocessing plant. 
The statal nuclear establishment has been restructured a number of times since 
its inception as the AEB. In 1982, the AEB and Ucor were converted into two 
companies - the Nuclear Development Corp. (Nucor) and the the Uranium 
Enrichment Corp ., respectively- with the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) as 
their controlling body. This year also saw the establishment of the Council for 
Nuclear Safety (CNS) within the i\EC. The i\EC was then further restructured 
when , in l985, Nucor and Ucor were amalgamated into the i\EC. In l988 the CNS 
become fully independent of the i\EC. 
In 1968 a subcommittee of the AEB reported to the Minister of Mines and Planning 
that a 350MW NPS would be viable in the Western Cape by 1978. The decision to 
build the station was pre-empted by Eskom in 1967, when the utility purchased 
the farm Duynefontein, site of the future NPS. The contracts to construct Koeberg 
were signed in 1976, and in 1984- after repairs of considerable damage sustained 
during an ANC attack on the NPS - the first reactor at Koeberg became opera-
tional , with the second following a year later. 
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Chapter 2 
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE AEC 
2.1 Global figures 
Government funding for the AEB/ AEC was apportioned under the vote for the 
department responsible for mines- the Department of Mines (DOM) prior to 
1984, and the Department of Mineral and Energy Nfairs (DMEA) subsequently. 
Table 2.11ists the annual budgets awarded to the AEC (or its forerunners the AEB 
and Ucor) and the CNS, as well the total DMEA/DOM vote. The tabulated figures 
are those obtained from parliamentary records (South Africa, Estimate of Expendi-
ture to be Defrayed from State Revenue Account. Government Printer, Pretoria, 2nd 
and final print, RP2 & 4). In some cases, the amounts budgeted for the AEB/ AEC 
by Parliament were subsequently adjusted within the department administering 
the funds, so that the parliamentary figure is not always the correct one; for those 
cases where the actual subsidy in any one year differed by more than 5% from 
that awarded by Parliament, the actual amount is indicated in parentheses. The 
latter data were obtained from the AEB Annual Reports, published until 1982, 
and the data for the years since then were supplied by the AEC (Stumpf 1993a). 
On average, the AEB/ AEC's budget differed by a factor of 1.006 from that 
awarded by Parliament over the period 1971-93. Because the figures differ so little, 
Figure 2.1 plots the parliamentary budgets, rather than the AEB/ AEC data. 
Table 2.1 Annual nuclear and total DOM/DMEA vote. Figures are in Rm. 
Year AEC/AEB UCOR CNS Total DMEA/DoM %of 
DMEA 
1971/2 6.390 6.390 39.938 16 
197213 6.709 6.709 38.605 17 
1973/4 8.762 8.762 43.992 20 
1974/5 15.978 15.978 82.909 19 
1975/6 17.1 74 51 .000 68.174 123.093 55 
1976/7 18.603 50.000 68.603 159.647 43 
1977/8 19.987 43.000 62.987 168.001 37 
1978/9 22.925 67.481 90.406 191 .998 47 
1979/80 32.400 99.895 132.295 404.828 33 
(33.951) (133.846) (33) 
1980/1 57.060 142.300 199.360 431.085 46 
(59.790) (202.090) (47) 
1981/2 76.835 173.400 250.235 385.634 65 
198213 114.958 200.600 315.558 477.645 66 
1983/4 352.921 0.075 352.996 534.967 66 
198415 370.000 0.075 370.075 557.637 66 
(351.305) (351.380) (63) 
1985/6 525.878 0.123 526.001 627.553 84 
1986/7 775.504 
I 
0.179 775.683 871.484 89 
(659 .970) (660.149) (76) 
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Year AEC/AEB UCOR CNS Total DMEA/DoM %of 
DMEA 
1987/8 671 .146 0.183 671.329 768.462 87 
(705.646) (705.829) (92) 
1988/9 619.018 0.180 619.198 745.831 83 
1989/90 640.000 5.200 645.200 786.816 82 
1990/1 712.700 6.653 719.353 1 133.610 63 
(673.500) (680.153) (59) 
1991/2 685.000 6.966 691 .966 896.092 77 
1992/3 451.958 5.089 457.047 687.205 67 
1993/4 469.096 5.398 474.494 707.606 67 
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FIGURE 2.1 Annual nuclear budgets and total DOM/DMEA vote. 
The data in Table 2.1 and f-igure 2.1 reveal five phases in the 1\EB/ /\EC's financial 
fortunes: in the early years, the AEB's portion of the budget was less than 20%, 
but in the 1975/6 financial year it shot up to 55%, remaining above 33% until 
1981/2. The budget then received a second boost and hovered in the region of 
66% for four years, before rising again, this time to between 85 and 90% in the 
years 1985/6 to 1989/90. The proportion then dropped slightly, to around 66%, 
where it is still located in the current year. figure 2.2 illustrates the actual budgets, 
both in current rands, and in 1993 rands adjusted for inflation at rates of 12%/yr 
for the period 1985-93, and 1 O%yr for 1970-93. 
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FIGURE 2 .. 2 Annual budgets, in current rands and adjusted for inflation. 
Table 2.2 gives a breakdown of how the AEC has apportioned its funds. The table 
shows how operating expenditure rose dramatically following the 1987/88 finan-
cial year, while capital expenditure decreased. These changes are related to the 
completion of capital works on the Z- and BEY 1\ plants, and the beginning of 
operations. /\s will be shown later, the Z-plant, in particular, is responsible for 
considerable operating expense. 
Table 2.2 AEC Application of funds. Figures are in Rm. Opex = Operating 
expenditure, Capex =Capital expenditure, and Interest= payment to loans, 
bridging finance and interest (Source: Stumpf 1993a). 
Year Opex Cap ex Interest 
83/84 250.345 171.293 62.628 
84/85 320.313 258.988 83.960 
85/86 359.501 194.191 138.467 
86/87 421.162 132.647 139.368 
87/88 384.897 121.215 175.987 
88/89 576.805 22.438 237.775 
89/90 592.104 40.695 185.390 
90/91 602.505 28.181 389.313 
91 /92 566.971 10.163 217.836 
92/93 556.833 20.690 119.244 
93/94 551 .1 55 39.647 169.472 
finally, the AEC projects further state support as follows (figures in Rm) (Stumpf 
1993a): 
94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 
536.843 460.769 271 .233 399.947 
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2.2 Divisional figures 
The AEC has seven Executive General Managers, each responsible for one divi-
sion. Operating expenditure (Opex) is spread essentially over these divisions: 
Corporate Business Development, Nuclear fuel Production (NfP), Pelindaba 
Technology Products (PTP), Human Resources, Technical Services, finance and 
Corporate Services, and Technology Development. In addition, the office of the 
Chief Executive has its own budget. By far the largest slice of Opex is consumed 
by the NfP division, which is responsible for operating the conversion, Z- and 
BEY A plants, as well as the Vaal puts facility. The next largest slice of overall Opex 
goes to the Technology Development section, formerly the R&D section, whose 
brief it is to establish new technologies and to create new products and processes. 
Table 2.3 lists the proportion of overall Opex that has gone to the NFP, PTP and 
Technology Development (TechDev) sections since their establishments as sepa-
rate divisions within the /\EC. 
The Nr:P division generates the largest income for the AEC, with further income 
coming from the sale of non-nuclear fuel products such as air filters, flourine 
chemicals, and radioisotopes through the PTP section, formerly called Peltek. 
Table 2.4 lists the income generated by the NFP and PTP divisions. 
Table 2.3 Breakdown of operating expenditure. Figures are in Rm. 
Year Total NFP % TechDev % PTP o/o 
Opex Opex Opex Opex 
88/89 576.805 332.699 58 60.942 11 
89/90 592.104 325.867 55 73.403 12 
90/91 602.505 287.207 48 79.537 13 
91 /92 566.971 285.378 50 81 .527 14 
92/93 556.833 253.421 46 80.191 14 82.833 15 
93/94 558.570 253.343 45 84.581 15 72.732 13 
94/95 579.622 251 .822 43 85 .643 15 87.921 15 
95/96 594.446 248.676 42 87.657 15 98 .521 17 
96/97 497 .370 161.161 32 64.75 8 13 106.112 21 
97/98 498.964 138.517 28 66.529 13 114.290 23 
Table 2.4 Breakdown of own income. Figures are in Rm. 
Year Total sales NFP sales % PTP sales % 
88/89 111 .278 60.514 54 50.764 46 
89/90 177.643 106.234 60 71 .409 40 
90/91 146.564 90.391 62 56 .1 73 38 
91 /92 172.156 93.967 55 78 .1 89 45 
92/93 192.821 101.969 53 90.852 47 
93/94 217.592 108.004 50 109.588 50 
94/95 276.980 129.842 47 147.138 53 
95/96 320.631 132.654 41 187.977 59 
96/97 320.329 47.096 15 273.233 85 
97/98 364 .269 I 51 .917 14 312.352 86 
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A comparison of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrates that the NfP division is not 
expected to break even during the period for which projections were supplied. 
At the same time, however, the i\EC's projections indicate that the sale of 
non-nuclear fuel products will be profitable, generating more income than the 
operating expenditure which the PTP division will consume. The latter part of 
this report will deal exclusively with the NfP division and its plans for the future, 
as well as those aspects of the Technology Development division that relate to the 
nuclear fuel industry. 
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Chapter 3 
PROSPECTS FOR THE NUCLEAR FUEL INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction: The MLIS peg 
As the cursory examination of the Opex:lncome situation for the NfP division in 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 has demonstrated, this section of the AEC is currently operating 
at a loss, and is likely to continue doing so for the foreseeable future. As will be 
shown later in this report, the only NFP service that is returning a profit is the 
Vaalputs facility; all other services - conversion, enrichment, and fabrication -
are very uneconomic, and it is debatable whether they could ever be operated on 
a commercial basis. Nonetheless, the division is pegging its hopes for a future in 
the nuclear fuels industry on the successful development of yet another enrich-
ment process, called the Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MUS) technique. 
The Technology Development division is responsible for implementing the R&D. 
program into MUS enrichment, and is devoting about R30-40m /yr to the project, 
out of its budget of R80m/yr. Because of the centrality of this MUS program to 
the AEC's plans to remain in the nuclear fuels business, this aspect will be 
discussed first. 
3.2 An overview of enrichment technologies 
Enrichment technologies can be divided into two broad types depending on the 
atomic processes they employ: those that utilise the 1.3% difference in mass 
between U235 and U238 atoms (mass action processes), and those that utilize the 
differences in the electronic energies of the two types of atom (quantum proc-
esses) . Currently only technologies based on mass action processes are in use, but 
many enrichment corporations believe that it is merely a matter of time before 
most of these are replaced by newer and more efficient technologies that employ 
quantum processes instead. Mass action-based technologies include diffusion 
and centrifuge methods, as well as the avowedly indigenous jet nozzle (Helikon) 
method. About 90% of global enriched uranium is produced in government-
owned diffusion plants in the US, France, and Russia, while the remaining 10% 
originate from privately-owned gas centrifuge plants in Holland, the UK, and 
Germany. Of these two processes, the centrifuge method is by far the more 
efficient, and while diffusion plants look set to make way for new technologies 
over the next decade, the operators of the centrifuge plants do not intend chang-
ing to quantum process-based technologies. 
Quantum process technologies under investigation are the AVLIS (Atomic Vapor 
Laser Isotope Separation), MUS (Molecular Laser Isotope Separation), and 
CRlSLA (Chemical Reaction by Isotope Selective Activition) methods. Early 
commercial deployment does not seem feasible for either of these. Before giving 
a brief overview of these proposed new enrichment technologies, some basic 
terminology and concepts need to be introduced. 
The rate at which an enrichment facility performs a separation of U235 and U238 
is measured in Separative Work Units (SWU); this is essentially a measure of the 
amount of work that needs to be done in order to enrich natural uranium -
containing 0.71% U235- to a certain higher percentage of U235. /\bout 5 SWU 
and 6kg of natural U308 are required to produce 1kg of 3.4% enriched uranium, 
but both of these quantities depend quite strongly on the amount of U235 that is 
left in the tailings from the enrichment process (the 'tails assay '). 
!\very important parameter in determining the efficiency (and profitability) of 
an enrichment process is the amount of energy consumed to produce one SWU. 
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The following table gives the approximate energy consumption for the various 
technologies (Eerkens 1989): 
Becker nozzle: 3000 kWhr /SWU 
Diffusion: 2500 II 
Centrifuge: 50 II 
AVUS: 40 II 
MUS: 30 II 
CRISLA: 10 II 
As can be seen, diffusion technology and the local method - which is equated 
with the German Becker technique in the article from which these data were 
obtained - are orders of magnitude less efficient than the centrifuge process, 
which, by comparison, is about as energy-intensive as the quantum processes. 
The data presented above are only averaged data that are intended to give an 
indication of the difference in efficiency between the methods, and the actual 
quantities might differ from plant to plant. In addition, since this is a very 
important operating and price parameter, the energy-intensivity is generally not 
made public by plant operators. However, in the case of South Africa's semi-com-
mercial enrichment plant, figures published by the AEC in its 1990 Review 
suggest a consumption of 9200 kWhr /SWU on a design efficiency of 5800 
kWhr/SWU, way above the published average figures. 
3.2.1 Quantum-based technologies 
Laser-based enrichment methods 
These techniques use the variations in the spectra of U235 and U238 feedstock 
material to separate the isotopes. There are essentially two competing methods: 
the atomic vapor laser isotope separation technique (A VUS), and the molecular 
laser isotope separation method (MUS). The two techniques are significantly 
different, and demand solutions to quite different sets of technological hurdles. 
In the A VUS method uranium metal is vaporized and atomized, and the U235 
atoms selectively excited and ionized by lasers operating at specific excitation 
frequencies of the U235 atom, as opposed to those of the U238. After ionization, 
U235 atoms can be separated from U238 by electromagnetic means. Problems 
associated with the technique are that it is based on uranium metal, which implies 
a change from the usual enrichment feedstock (UF6) of the nuclear fuel chain, and 
the need for materials that are capable of resisting corrosion with gaseous 
uranium at around 2200 degrees Celsius. 
In MUS the feed material is Ur:6 vapor, with 235Ur:6 molecules being selectively 
ionized and subsequently dissociated into UF5, which is formed as a solid and 
can easily be separated from the gaseous feed. The major hurdle here is the 
complexity of the molecular spectrum of UF6 which considerably complicates the 
choice of excitation frequency; in A VUS, on the other hand, there is a well-defined 
isotope shift in the spectra of U235 and U238. Research suggests that both 
techniques are able to enrich to nuclear power plant levels in one step, but the 
separation factor (ie, the efficiency) for AVUS is much higher than for MUS. In 
addition, the high-power copper lasers used in A VUS are commercially available, 
whereas the carbon dioxide laser needed for MUS is at an earlier development 
stage. These factors, coupled to the more complex nature of the selective excita-
tion process for MUS, have presumably militated against the choice of MUS 
technology in the US, UK, r=rance and Japan, where A VUS was chosen instead; 
in Holland both i\ VLIS and MUS are being studied, while in Germany the focus 
is on MUS (Clark & Addington-Lee 1989: 42-4). (Perhaps the close cooperation 
between the German and South African nuclear industries that has existed in the 





12 The South African nuclear fuel industry 
past, has played a role in persuading the /\EC to opt for MUS.) Basic research on 
MUS began in SA in 1983. 
The US and france were hoping to have pilot laser-€nrichment plants in operation 
by the mid 1990s, and commercial plants by about the tum of the century. 
However, after eight years of advanced R&D efforts in 1\ VLIS technology, and 
an investment of more than one billion dollars by the US Department of Energy 
(DOE). even the most optimistic forecasts do not see this technology being ready 
for commercial exploitation before 2005 (Meade & Schwartz 1992: 56-8). One 
independent assessment (by Energy Resources International) of the commercial 
viability of an A VLIS plant in the US determined that in order to merely recover 
all R&D and construction costs, a 9 million SWU/yr plant would require prices 
of $130/SWU, while a smaller 3 million SWU/yr plant would need a price of 
$282/ SWU (Meade & Addington-Lee 1992). In another study, the Edison Electric 
Institute found that production costs could well be much higher than $74/SWU 
(NEI 6/ 91: 2) . These estimates should be compared to the DOE's projected 
production costs of between $25 and $37 /SWU (NEI 3/90: 4; NEI 6/91: 2), and to 
the current spot market price of about $68/SWU. 
In the face of such cost escalations, the DOE is now expecting either private 
investors or a restructured government enrichment corporation to deploy a 
commercial AVLIS plant. NEI sardonically comments that 'the financial risks 
would appear to make such an undertaking by either sector unlikely' , in light of 
the present situation in the international nuclear fuel market (Meade & Schwartz 
1992). In response to such gloomy prospects, the DOE has severely curtailed the 
1\ VLIS budget, and has redistributed the R&D costs accrued (one billion dollars) 
into the operation of its gaseous diffusion plants. (This may be one of the factors 
for the high enrichment prices that the DOE is charging; see Section 3.4.1.) 
Chemical methods 
In laser enrichment methods the energy for the separation of U235 from U238 is 
derived from industrial-scale lasers, while in the centrifuge and diffusion tech-
niques it is supplied by electrical power which drives the pumps, compressors, 
and rotating machinery that bring about the separation. In the Chemical Reaction 
by Isotope Selective Activation (CRISLA) method, the energy for this separation 
is mainly chemical. Here a laser, tuned to specifically excite 23Sur:6, catalyses a 
reaction between this molecule and a co-reactant, to produce a chemical species 
that can then be separated from 238Ur:6 by normal chemical means. The energy 
needed to activate the reaction is much less than that needed to ionize uranium 
atoms (A VLIS) or Uf-6 molecules (MUS), giving CRISLA a competitive edge on 
the other methods (Eerkens 1989). 
Until Aprill993, the CRISLA method was being developed in a cooperative R&D 
effort by US and Canadian private corporations, who had planned to have a 
modular plant with a capacity of 250 000 SWU in operation by the mid 1990s. 
Since then, however, the Canadian partner- Cameco Corp.- decided to terminate 
its joint project. One reason given was that the surplus of enriched uranium from 
the CIS had 'significantly ' changed the enrichment market, so that the opportu-
nity Cameco saw when it entered the joint venture 'has diminished in the near 
term' (NF 12/ 4/ 93: 4). 
3.2.2 The future 
Although diffusion technology is extremely inefficient, diffusion plants produce 
about 90% of global enriched uranium, with the more efficient centrifuge enrich-
ment method supplying the balance. /\part from the US's $1 billion 1\ VLIS R&D 
program which has recently been cut back, research into new enrichment tech-
nologies has been fairly modest in budgetary terms, and it is therefore impossible 
to say at this stage how they might compete against present technology, in 
particular against centrifuge methodology. Indeed, Urenco - the Dutch, German , 
ENE RG Y FOR DEVELOPME NT RESEARCH CE NTR E 
I 
. - - --·" .,, '"a'' IIUGiear rue1 1naustry 13 
and British conglomerate which operates centrifuge plants in Europe - is so 
confident of the commercial viability of its technology, that it is participating in 
a venture to construct a 1.5 million SWU /yr plant in Louisiana and is expanding 
its Almelo plant in Holland. 
Even if new enrichment technologies such as AVUS or MUS are developed to 
the point where they are commercially viable, it would be some time before they 
could supplant significant amounts of production from existing diffusion and 
centrifuge plants, owing to long lead-times in construction. In the interim, diffu-
sion plants would not be shut down, even if their continued operation is economi-
cally unfeasible, because enrichment has always constituted a strategic service-
and will continue to be regarded as such, notwithstanding the end of the Cold 
War. Undertakings to introduce new technologies would therefore face consid-
erable political and financial obstacles, and it may well be that these factors- as 
much as technological difficulties- have militated against greater R&D efforts 
into these new technologies. 
3.3 The South African MUS program 
In 1983 the AEC embarked on a research program into laser separation technolo-
gies. The MUS method was chosen above A VUS largely because of the experi-
ence with UF6-handling technologies and aerodynamics, gained from the local 
aerodynamic enrichment process. For a long time this program was run in parallel 
with research into centrifuge methods, but in 1986 a decision was taken to 
concentrate on the development of a pilot MUS plant, and 1991 the centrifuge 
research was closed down. The AEC is unwilling to release details of its invest-
ment in MUS research thus far, but it is widely believed that the annual budget 
is about R40m (in 1993 rands), and the total investment not more than R250-300m. 
In fact, the AEC prides itself on having spent relatively little on the program, while 
having achieved considerable successes. 
The AEC claims four major breakthroughs in its MUS research. The first concerns 
the design of a very efficient nozzle (a variant of the Laval nozzle) that allows 
extremely rapid cooling over fairly long distances of the incoming UF6 stream. 
(When irradiating the UF6 molecules, it is essential that they are at very low 
energy levels, which means temperatures have to be extremely low, of the order 
of -173 degrees centigrade. Ordinary refrigeration methods are insufficient and 
far too inefficient for this process, and so instantaneous expansion of the gas into 
a vacuum is used to cool the feed.) In addition , the AEC claims to have developed 
the first industrial-scale carbon dioxide laser; this is another crucial aspect of the 
MUS method, since commercial MUS enrichment plants would require massive 
lasers for the supply of sufficient energy to large-scale UF6 streams. Thirdly, it 
claims to have developed the first industrial-scale Raman cell, which retunes the 
laser's frequency to the exact frequency for irradiation of the 23\JF6 molecules. 
Lastly, the AEC claimed recently to have achieved a single-step enrichment 
process up to about 4% U235 on a macro scale (Stumpf 1993b) This would bring 
it approximately in line with the reputed efficiency of the A VUS process. 
The pilot plant facilities developed thus far, and the AEC's claims about its 
successes may well appear impressive to outsiders. But it is not possible to make 
an independent assessment of the true state of the technology in this program, 
since the AEC jealously guards what it views as proprietary information. This 
reluctance to divulge details about the MUS program is, of course, not unique to 
the /\EC; it is shared by all other bodies involved in research into new or improved 
enrichment technologies. This also means that even if it were possible to examine 
the AEC claims, there would be no yardstick to measure them by. 
Emboldened by its success, the AEC embarked in 1991 on the construction of the 
pilot MUS plant due for completion in 1995. Although it will have a nominal 
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capacity of 20 OOOSWU/yr, the plant will be operated continuously for short 
periods only. It is intended that the pilot plant will supply the data that are 
necessary for evaluating the feasibility of a commercial MUS undertaking in 1995. 
However, the AEC's phrasing of the purpose of the pilot plant ('to confimt the 
operating parameters on plant scale'), suggests that a decision about the feasibil-
ity may already have been made on the basis of operating experience gained in 
the MUS R&D program thus far (du Toit, Ronander & Birkill1993). In the event 
of positive results from the pilot plant, the intention was to begin construction of 
a commercial plant in 1996, subject to an outside investor being found. This plan 
has in the meantime been postponed by a few years because of uncertainty in a 
number of variables, particularly the potential source of funds (Stumpf 1993b). It 
seems that the earlier insistence on private sector financing has been relaxed 
somewhat, since the AEC now does not believe 'that the Government should 
necessarily fund such a commercial plant' (Stumpf 1993b). 
Given a 10 year lifespan for the commercial MUS plant and real capital costs of 
between 6 and 12%, the AEC conservatively estimates that a plant with a capacity 
of 400-SOOtSWU /yr and a specific energy consumption of about 150kWhr /SWU 
should produce SWU at a price of US$60 per unit (du Toit, Ronander & Birkill 
1993) - even though the projected energy intensity does not compare favourably 
with the averaged figures presented earlier. If the AEC's predictions were ful-
filled despite the apparently high energy requirements of the plant, it would 
certainly make the plant highly competitive, considering the current spot market 
price of about $68/ SWU. However, in the case of the DOE's cost projections for 
its AVUS process (see above), the economic models on which the predictions 
were based were found to be seriously flawed by independent evaluators, and it 
is possible that the local models may also exhibit flaws on closer analysis. (The 
AEC has indicated a willingness to open its models to independent scrutiny.) 
As mentioned before, an objective evaluation of the prospects for the AEC' s MUS 
technology would be extremely difficult to perform, owing to the (perhaps 
necessary) commercial secrecy surrounding it. It may be possible to evaluate 
certain aspects- such as the laser and Raman cell performance- against industry 
benchmarks, if the AEC were to make benchmark data available. But even if 
individual components are truely competitive, this by no means implies that the 
process in its entirety would be so. Moreover, as was argued above, there is no 
guarantee that new enrichment technologies would be able to break into the 
market, even though they may l;>e far more efficient than diffusion or even 
centrifuge plants, since for strategic reasons governments are unlikely to let their 
enrichment plants be mothballed by simple economic rationale. On face value 
alone, it seems implausible that with an outlay not exceeding US$ 100m the AEC 
could have produced a technology that rivals or outdoes its A VUS and MUS 
competitors in other countries with scientific and technological infrastructures 
far more advanced than those in this country, and R&D budgets many orders of 
magnitude greater . In this regard , it should perhaps not be forgotten that in the 
early 1970s the AEB made similar claims to having developed a new, economi-
cally viable enrichment technique entirely on its own - a process that we now 
know to be wholly unviable. 
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3.4 The international nuclear fuel market 
3.4.1 Historic overview and present situation 
Scale of market 
15 
In order to give some perspective to the discussion of the global uranium and 
nuclear fuels market, it is useful to gain an appreciation of the average annual 
consumption of these products by a typical late-generation nuclear power station: 
an average 900MW pressurized water reactor, of the type situated at Koeberg, 
operated at 65% capacity and fueled by 3.25% enriched uranium requires about 
150t/yr of U308, equivalent to 127~ uranium, about 16tU/yr low enriched 
uranium, and .approximately 80 OOOSWU/yr of separative work (du Toit 1993). 
In 1991 total uranium demand in the West was 47 OOOtU, of which 42 OOOt were 
procured on the market. Those countries previously classified as the World 
Outside the Centrally Planned Areas (WOCA) produced 27 OOOt. (Western and 
'Eastern' nuclear industries were largely separate until1990, and so most histori-
cal data refer only to the Western uranium market.) Table 3.1 gives a breakdown 
of the global uranium market in 1989, listing total output, total existing produc-
tion capacity, mothballed capacity, and capacity that is planned or under con-
struction. In terms of active or passive capacity little has changed since then, and 
it is true to say that for all stages of the fuel chain, supply and/ or capacity outstrip 
present demand. 
Table 3.1 World nuclear fuel market. Summary of data from the Fuel Review 
1991, Nuclear Engineering International (NEI), and the 1991 Report and 1992 
Update from the Uranium Institute (UI). Figures given in parentheses refer to 
global totals, those without parentheses to WOCA countries only. 
1989 output production mothballed on drawing 
capacity board 
U308 (ktU) 34.215 (UI) 57.200 (NEI) 23.820 (NEI) 6.530 (NEI) 
(50.575) 
Conversion 54.000 (UI) 97.242 (NEI) 0.300 (NEI) 
(ktU) (65000) (67.390) (UI) 
Enrichmet:~t 24.00a 33.30 (NEI&UI) 8.35 (NEI) 1.61 (NEI) 
(ktSWU) (43 .3) 
Fabrication 9.000 (UI) 14.119 (NEI) 0.616 (NEI) 4.637 (NEI) 
(ktU) 10.280 (UI) 
(14.819) (NEI) 
8 Rough estimate from Nuclear Energy 1990, v29(4). 
Overview 
The international uranium and nuclear fuels market has undergone a metamor-
phosis since the early days of commercial nuclear power in the 1970s. In those 
days utilities invariably took out long-term supply contracts at specified prices, 
often with the suppliers of their NPSs, who in turn usually dealt directly with 
primary producers. Hardly any spot markets for nuclear fuel products and very 
few intermediate traders existed. Today, a major portion of transactions takes 
place on the spot market, contracts are for shorter terms often linked to spot and 
without floor prices, and the traditional suppliers of nuclear fuel products now 
compete with traders, some of whom can offer a much larger menu of products 
and terms than primary suppliers. for example, in the period 1987 to 1990 the 
level of spot market activities increased from about4000tU/yrtoabout 16000t/yr 
in 1990 (Neff 1991: 11-15) . Of the latter about 10 OOOt were sold by traders, 5 OOOt 
by producers, and the balance by utilities, with an additional amount of about 
9 OOOt delivered at spot market price under long-term spot-linked contracts. 
These volumes should be compared to the amount of 38 OOOtU procured during 
1990, and a total requirement of 43 OOOt; that is, about 66% of total trade, and 58% 
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of total requirements were obtained from the spot market, or under prices linked 
to spot, and 12% (5 OOOtU) were met from inventory. 
These changes in market structure have been accompanied by a steady decline in 
the price of uranium since it reached its highest point in 1977 at about $208/kg 
U308 (in 1992 dollars), with prices currently as low as $19/kg. As a consequence 
of this decline, trading in uranium assets at spot market-related prices has almost 
always resulted in negative returns, with the exception of the late 1970s, when 
positive returns were recorded if assets were bought early in the decade and sold 
within a few years. An analysis of price performance by market analyst Thomas 
L. Neff (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) has shown that it has not been 
possible to earn a positive real return since 1976 if assets were held for three years 
or more, and spot-based transactions were engaged in: the average three-year 
return in the period 1980-1990 was -13.5% with a standard variation of 7.3. 
However, for shorter holding times there have been brief periods when it was 
possible to earn a positive return, with the average one-year return being -12.3% 
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FIGURE 3.1 South African and WOCA uranium production. Data for the period 
1970 to 1991, as a function of current price, and price adjusted for inflation (in US$/kg 
U308). (Source: Uranium Institute 1993.) 
In fact, apart from a short boom period between late 1974 and 1981, the price of 
U308 has remained below $75/kg (in 1992 dollars) for most of the past quarter 
century, and one could argue that the boom was an aberration of the market 
brought about by a specific and unusual confluence of events. Several factors 
played a role, including the Arab oil embargo of 1973, a depletion of uranium 
inventories held by the major producers, and an increase in the tails assay allowed 
by the US government - which means that more ore has to be used in order to 
manufacture a given quantity of uranium oxide. In addition, there have been 
allegations that a cartel of the major uranium producers- represented by compa-
nies in Canada, france, South Africa, Australia and the UK -conspired to drive 
up the market price, with the connivance of their governments. These allegations 
arose out of a number of anti-trust suits tabled in US courts which were never 
publicly resolved, since they were all settled out-of-court (Moss 1981 ch 8). 
Interestingly, until 1993 South Africa's Nuclear Energy 1\ct prohibited dissemi-
nation by anyone of any information relating to any uranium transactions, 
'whether in or outside the Republic' , during the period 1 January 1972 to 31 
December 1975. 
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The development of a spot market and the decline in uranium prices, has also 
been linked to an oversupply of uranium and other nuclear fuel products on the 
market. Prices started dropping when global inventories of uranium built up 
during a period of high prices in the 1970s, began to be sold, partially as a response 
to a slower than expected growth in nuclear power programs. Inventories were 
originally built up in anticipation of a major NPS construction phase. This was 
not realised, however, as a result of a downturn in political and popular support 
for nuclear power, a slower rate of increase in electricity demand than had been 
expected, and increasingly unclear economic benefits. As pressure to reduce the 
costs of nuclear power began to mount in the 1980s, so utilities began to sell off 
inventories. At the same time they began taking advantage of the greater flexi-
bility of the emerging spot market, by unbundling nuclear fuel into its component 
parts, in order to have greater control of their fuel procurement schedules and 
practices. This diversification of supply further stimulated the emergence of the 
spot market. 
Although supply of uranium outstrips demand, production currently lags be-
hind. Since 1987 demand has been bigger than production, and has been partially 
fed from inventory. However, these inventories are large, since total WOC/\ 
uranium production up to 1991 was 1016ktU, while total requirements during 
that time were only 591kt U ( UI 1992) . In other words, total Western overproduc-
tion corresponds to requirements over nine or ten years at current levels, though 
it is not clear what proportion of this surplus is avaliable to the market. It must 
be mentioned here too, that these estimates of inventory refer only to uranium 
produced for civilian use (Uranium Institute maintains only records of uranium 
mined for civilian purposes), and do not reflect amounts that might become 
available through dismantling of nuclear weapons. These amounts may be vast, 
since most uranium mined prior to 1970 was channeled into weapons programs. 
The case of ex-Soviet highly enriched uranium from weapons sources, for exam-
ple, will be discussed in more detail later. 
The changed market structure has brought about substantial changes in price 
formation. Instead of being determined by production costs, the level and 
direction of price are today set in a trading-dominated spot market environment, 
in which the role of the traditional supplier has been supplanted by the increasing 
predominance of traders as purchasers and intermediates, and which is fueled 
by inventory liquidation and ex-Soviet and other non-traditional supply sources. 
Utilities act as traders, converters as brokers, brokers as traders, producers as 
buyers, and so on; de-enrichment, de-conversion, loans, swaps, interchanges, and 
other new kinds of transactions have proliferated and bedevilled the process of 
price formation . (For instance, the decline in U308 spot price from about $50/kg 
in 1987 to less than $26/kg in 1990, was inversely correlated with the increase in 
spot activity (Neff 1991).) These changes suggest that nuclear fuel is taking on 
the attributes of a commodity market. And even in cases where utilities do still 
take out long-term contracts, these are more often than not linked to spot prices 
- without floor price provisions- creating the same market impact as if a series 
of spot purchases were being made. With the entry into the market of large 
amounts of ex-Soviet uranium and nuclear fuel products, the influence of pro-
duction costs on price formation is likely to be reduced even further , since in the 
case of the CIS states, those costs are only quantifiable with great difficulty , if at 
all, owing to a combination of inadequate accounting methodologies and restric-
tive disclosure practices. In addition, most of these supplies will be marketed 
through traders, thereby further distancing production from the market. 
The general malaise that has developed in the global U308 market has also 
infected the enrichment market, whose size is of the order of US$ 3 to 4 billion 
per annum (Nuclear Energy 1990, 29( 4): 229) . 1\t present there is overcapacity with 
about 33m SWU/yr capacity compared to 24m SWU/yr demand; this situation 
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is compounded when mothballed US and UK capacity (about 8m SWU/yr) and 
active Russian capacity (conservatively estimated at 10m SWU/yr) are included 
(Nuclear Energy 1990, 29(4)). In addition, an expansion of capacity by at least 
1.6m SWU/yr is planned for the next five years, which would mean that global 
capacity would outstrip present demand by a factor of at least two in the late 1990s 
(Quinn 1990: 29-32) - though some of the plants at that stage may require large 
subsidies in order to compete on the market. In addition, the spot price per SWU 
has dropped from about $105 in 1986 to $65 in 1993 (both in 1993 dollars) . This 
decline in the market has occurred even though investment in enrichment capac-
ity has almost always, because of its importance in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons, been politically motivated - and has therefore not been subject to 
economic rationale. 
Until the early nineties, the SWU market was dominated by the US Department 
of Energy (DOE) and the French enrichment corporation Eurodif, whose market-
ing is controlled by Cogema, the French nuclear fuel organisation. Together they 
accounted for about 90% of WOCA production, with Urenco- a German, Dutch, 
and British consortium -producing the balance. Since then, the Russian export 
agency for nuclear products, Techsnabexport (TENEX), has entered the market 
and is fast becoming the lowest-cost producer and supplier, thereby increasing 
the downward pressure on prices to an even greater extent. This intervention 
has reduced the US DOE's market share, and in response there have been moves 
to privatise the facility in the hope of enabling it to respond to market trends and 
demands more quickly. On July 1, 1993, the US DOE enrichment services were 
transformed into a government corporation as an intermediate step towards full 
commercialisation, and in its first month the new US Enrichment Corporation 
(USEC) offered SWU at slightly over $100/SWU, while spot price was around 
$70. Whether or not USEC will be able to compete with spot prices is not clear, 
though the DOE is certainly buffeting the corporation against real costs: in terms 
of the legislation setting it up, USEC will lease two plants from the DOE (at a cost 
of $5.19m), while a wide range of environmental, safety, and personnel liabilities 
-that would otherwise raise USEC's costs- are to remain with the DOE. 
The pattern of depressed prices, overcapacity, large inventory, and vigorous 
competition described above for the U308 and enrichment markets, also holds 
for the conversion and fuel fabrication markets. In the US, for example, expected 
demand for fuel fabrication services for the next ten years lies at 2000tU/yr, while 
capacity is estimated to be in excess of 4000tU/yr (Schwartz 1990: 19-20.) In 
summary, it can be said that the present state of the nuclear fuel market is a utility 
manager's dream and a nuclear fuel producer's nightmare. 
3.4.2 The role of Eastern Europe and the CIS 
Without a doubt, the two most destabilising factors in the global uranium and 
nuclear fuel market are the unknown size of the Russian uranium inventory, and 
uncertainty regarding the costs of its enrichment capacity - which means that 
Russian SWU prices cannot be anticipated by other market competitors. Little is 
known about the Eastern European (EE) nuclear industry, because it has histori-
cally been fairly separate from that in the West. None of the EE countries 
developed their own nuclear fuel chain; instead they had to deliver all uranium 
mined to the Soviet Union (specifically Russia), which then supplied all nuclear 
technology and plant. Spent reactor fuel also had to be returned to the Soviet 
Union. Trade between market economies and centrally planned ones was fairly 
limited until the late 1980s, even though TENEX first appeared on the primary 
enrichment market in the early 1970s. It entered the spot market in 1986, and in 
1990 the USSR for the first time allowed the sale of concentrates and enriched 
uranium product (EUP] . (EUP is low enriched uranium, ready for fabrication into 
reactor fuel; its cost includes the cost of U308, conversion, and enrichment 
services.] Even though Russia and the CIS states have been in the spot market 
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for just three years, they have already made a considerable impact, and are set to 
gain larger market shares in the future. 
The likely CIS- and specifically Russian- impact on the market is linked to the 
size of its accumulated uranium reserves, which are not known with any degree 
of accuracy. However, the authoritative German nuclear trading company 
NUKEM estimates that about 600ktU was produced in EE between 1945-90, of 
which 100kt went into power production, about 200kt to the weapons program, 
leaving a stockpile of around 200ktU (Schreiber 1991: 7-11). The trade journal, NF 
conservatively estimates that at least 385ktU were produced up to 1990, of which 
about 200kt have been stockpiled (Knapic & Dizard 1993a: 1-3), while the Ura-
nium Institute estimates the stockpile to be 140-160ktU (UI 1991). In other words, 
the range of estimates of CIS stock is 140-200ktU. It is not known in what form 
the inventory is held, but TENEX is aggressively marketing its products abroad, 
and it can supply large amounts quickly. For example, during its first year (1990) 
in the EUP market the agency shipped EUP containing about 800tSWU and 
1700tU equivalent, and in the last few years, Russian and CIS uranium has begun 
to swamp the US: in the four years from 1988 to 1991 imports climbed from 73tU 
(0.5% of the US requirement) (NEI 1/92: 3) to 5600tU (33.6%) (NF21/10/92: 1-6). 
In those years US production stood at 5072 and 3036tU, respectively, which means 
that Russian imports rose from practically nothing to almost double US produc-
tion in the period 1988-90. Not only is Russia/ CIS able to supply large quantities 
to the market, it also offers bargain-basement prices. for example, in mid-1993 
the CIS offered Uf-6 to a US utility at below the spot market price of US$ 
24.30/kgU, at a time when the most recent deals had been concluded at around 
US$30.30/kgU (NF 7 /6/93). 
The apparently huge Russian uranium stockpile and its ability to produce serv-
ices at below marginal Western cost, has considerably unnerved the nuclear fuel 
market, and there have been attempts in the US and in Europe to control and/or 
embargo imports from CIS states. In the US, a complaint about unfair trade 
practices, based on perceived dumping of uranium and enrichment services, was 
filed by US uranium companies, in conjunction with the Atomic Workers Union 
and the DOE against the CIS states. The outcome was that the US agreed to 
import at least ten tonnes/yr of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russian 
nuclear weapons for deconcentration, in return for which the CIS states agreed 
to abide by a quota for uranium imports. Some CIS states have not acceded to 
this accord and their imports are subject to surcharges in the region of 120%, but 
this surcharge may not be justifiable under GA TI regulations. While this agree-
ment may not seem ideal to US uranium and SWU producers, it does at least mean 
that Russian uranium and enriched uranium will not swamp the market, but will 
be imported in known quantities, linked to price limits- the higher the spot price, 
the bigger the quota. The exact amount of HEU imported annually is not 
stipulated in the agreement, and it is independent of the imported U308. While 
the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) has not yet imposed quotas on CIS uranium, 
it has attempted to set floor-prices of about US$ 33.80/kgU308 below which the 
CIS uranium may not be sold- much to the irritation of the European utilities. In 
return, the CIS is proposing a price of US$ 18.20/kgU308- close to the spot price 
of about $18.50/kgU308 in mid 1993- but a price between $46 and $62 is needed 
for profitable production in the West. The issue has not yet been resolved 
(MacLachlan 1993: 1-4). According to its deputy director, the ESA's brief is to 
maintain a European fuel industry, as well as to help EC consumers and their 
governments to support uranium producers 'that are indispensable to the econ-
omy of certain countries' such as Niger or Namibia. (Of course, one should not 
forget that in many such cases the uranium mines are owned by European and 
North American multinationals, and in any event, uranium production is also 
vital for the economies of some of the countries whose uranium is being embar-
goed.) 
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Despite concerted attempts by Western uranium and SWU suppliers to control 
the release of Russian production onto the market, TENEX is bullish about its 
prospects. The vice-minister of Russia's Ministry for Atomic Energy (MI-
NATOM) has claimed, for instance, that Russia's world market share could rise 
to between 20 and 25 per cent and that based on production capacity its exports 
should be at least SktU/yr (twice their present level) and 8-lOktSWU/yr 
(MacLachlan 1993). Domestic demand, and demand in those countries tradition-
ally supplied by Russia, will determine how much of the CIS stockpile is available 
to the market. The current trend for nuclear electricity in the CIS is downwards: 
plans for NPS construction have been reduced, and slowed for those under 
construction, and in addition, there have been many shutdowns in the last few 
years, as safety standards in the EE nuclear industry are slowly forced to comply 
with those in the West. Uranium requirements in the former non-WOCA coun-
tries is expected to increase marginally from about 7000tU /yr in 1991 to 
8000tU /yr by the turn of the century, and then remain at that level until2010 ( UJ 
1992). 
3.4.3 Future scenarios 
The future of the nuclear fuels market is dependent on the future of nuclear 
power, and the latter is extremely difficult to predict owing to a combination of 
political uncertainty and changing patterns in global energy demands. In the 
space of just one year, for instance, the Uranium Institute had to alter its 1991 
forecasts for world nuclear generating capacity downwards by 6% as a result of 
a 42% reduction in the forecast for generating capacity in Eastern Europe and the 
CIS. Nonetheless, the Uranium Institute forecasts a 23% rise in global nuclear 
generating capacity between 1991 and 2010, with a rise of 14% by the tum of the 
century (UJ 1992). Most of the increase is forecast to come from Japan, France, 
South Korea, and Taiwan whose respective capacities are predicted to grow by 
82, 31, 189, and 41%, from 1991 values of 31.9, 55.7, 7.2, and 4.9GWe- in the latter 
two cases, therefore, the increase comes from a low base. It is not clear from the 
UI data to what extent the envisaged increase in Japanese and French generating 
capacity derives from hypothetical fast breeder reactor construction, and to what 
extent it can be attributed to proposed new (traditional) light-water reactors. 
(Fast breeder reactors would have a quite different impact on uranium and, 
particularly, on enrichment requirements.) Interestingly, in those countries in 
which political opposition to nuclear power is more vociferously expressed- the 
US, UK, and Germany - capacity is expected to remain constant, or even to 
decrease slightly. 
Table 3.2 World nuclear generating capacity forecast. Data are taken from the 
Uranium Institute's 1992 Update, and figures are given in net GWe. Values for 
1991 are actual figures . 
1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 
West 279.8 298.9 319.3 335.6 345.6 
East 40.9 45.2 46.8 47.7 47.4 
Global 320.8 344.1 366.1 363.3 393.0 
Western uranium requirements are projected to rise from the 1991 values by 
about 17% by 2005, thereafter flattening out, while non-WOCI\ requirements are 
expected to rise slightly above present levels. Conversion, enrichment and fuel 
fabrication capacities are forecast to remain about constant, or to increase slightly, 
but in all cases capacity is expected to run well ahead of demand. Predictions for 
price behaviour partially follow those for uranium turnover, according to fore-
casts by the energy policy research organisation Energy Resources International 
(ERI) in its 1993 N r Cycle Supply and Price l?eport (Knapic & Dizard 1993b: 1, 14-15). 
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ERI predicts a rise in U308 price from $26/kg in 1993 to $31-42/kg in 1995 and 
36-57 (1993 dollars) by 2000. (Actual spot price in mid 1993 was $18-21/kg.) The 
predicted increases for conversion, enrichment, and fabrication services are not 
quite as large, probably as a consequence of the projected overcapacity for the 
foreseeable future. Thus UF6 prices are expected to rise from about $4.74/kgU 
(mid 1993 spot) to between $5.50 and $6 in 2000, thereafter levelling off, while 
SWU price is forecast to change from a spotprice of about $68/SWU (mid 1993) 
through $82-93 (1995) and $95-117 (2000) to $95-135 in 2005 and beyond (Knapic 
& Dizard 1993b). Prices of fabricated fuel are expected to remain 'flat' at 
$200/kgU for PWR and $300/kgU for BWR fuel. 
Table 3.3 Forecasts for the nuclear industry. Uranium Institute forecasts for 
uranium requirements in the former WOCA and non-WOCA countries, as well as 
estimates for conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication capacities and demand 
up to 2010. Figures for 1991 are actual figures; data from the Uranium Institute 
1992 Update. 
1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 
U requirements West (ktU) 40.92 50.31 54.11 54.70 54.75 
U requirements East (ktU) 6.57 8.59 8.44 7.73 7.57 
Conversion capacity (ktU) 67.39 67.89 67.89 67.89 67.89 
Enrichment capacity (ktSWU) 42.9 44.6 47.7 47.7 47.7 
Enrichment demand (ktSWU) 23.0 25.8 27.6 29.1 30.0 
Fabrication capacity (ktU) 10.28 10.48 10.68 10.68 10.68 
Predictions about trends in the nuclear industry can clearly be wrong, and when 
they are made by nuclear industry participants or members they are sometimes 
inclined toward bullish sentiments. For instance, the UI 1979 forecasts for ura-
nium production for the years 1979-85 and 1990 were, on average, 49% optimistic, 
its (conservative) 1979 estimates of theoretical uranium demand for the years 
1979-90 were, on average, 62% above actual demand, and 1986 estimates of 
uranium requirements for the years 1986-91 , while correctly predicting a down-
tum, tended to overestimate demand by 23%. 
Hanging above all these uncertainties inherent to the nuclear industry, are the 
additional questions regarding the size of the Russian inventory, the ability of 
CIS states to deliver natural uranium, the effect of the dismantling of Russian 
nuclear weapons, and the likely production costs of Russian SWU. The size of 
the uranium inventory has already been discussed, and we will turn here to an 
examination of enrichment capacity. By current estimates, Russia can produce 
about 10ktSWU /yr, with at least one plant using modern- and therefore possibly 
competitive- centrifuge technology. Domestic and Eastern European demand is 
about 5kt SWU, demand for other contracts is about 2kt SWU, leaving about 3kt 
SWU for fresh production. In addition, it is likely that inventory can be drawn 
on, so that there should be enough excess capacity to provide well over 5kt/yr 
SWU by the end of the decade. Accordingly, NUKEM predicts that by 2000 
TENEX will have absorbed 40% of WOCA unfilled demand, giving it a total 
market share of at least 15%. If this happens, the West's uncommitted enrichment 
capacity will be considerably more than twice unfilled demand at the end of the 
1990s, which means that new enrichment suppliers will experience great diffi-
culty in establishing themselves in that market (Schreiber 1991). 
Contracts have already apparently been drawn up between TEN EX and Western 
traders. According to reports in trade journals, for example, it seems likely that 
Global Nuclear Services & Supply Ltd . (GNS&S)- a joint venture by TEN EX and 
the nuclear fuel trading company NUEXCO- will seek to market 2-2.5ktSWU/yr 
at prices between $70 and $80/ SWU. This would make GNS&S the global price 
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leader for long-term contracts. (NEI 8/91: 14) Even in South Africa, the private 
nuclear fuel company Nutron Energy Services International claims to have 
contracted TENEX to supply a minimum of 40t and a maximum of 200tSWU/yr 
for ten years at prices of about $80/SWU. At these prices, purchasers willing to 
take on the possible risks associated with supplies from Russia may be able to 
build up stockpiles at very low prices, to see them through possible periods of 
disrupted supply. The extremely low prices that TENEX is able to offer for SWU 
have led some US Senators and nuclear industry representatives to raise the 
spectre of trade barriers on the grounds that the low-priced SWU would threaten 
'national security concerns' (NEI 8/91), although, in contrast to the situation with 
natural uranium imports, no barriers have yet been erected. (Recent reports 
suggest that the price of SWU supplied by TENEX to Korea is 'well below' the 
US DOE $90/SWU (NF 7 /6/93).) 
In addition to highly competitive Russian SWU production, there is the question 
of the market impact of Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU). The quid pro 
quo deal between the US and Russia (see Section 3.4.2) will see USEC paying 
about $780/kg for 500tHEU blended down with 1.5% U-235 feed to a level of 4.4% 
U-235. USEC apparently breaks down the price of the resulting low enriched 
uranium (LEU) into $82.10/SWU plus $28.50/kgU as UF6. These prices compare 
unfavourably with the marginal cost of SWU production (less than $60/SWU at 
present), and the spot price for UF6 (about $25/kgU). It is therefore not clear 
whom USEC will be able to persuade to contract for the de-concentrated HEU. 
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the HEU will have no market impact, since the 
volumes of LEU derived from it are huge. According to Julian Steyn of Energy 
Resources International, lOtHEU, the minimum the US has to import annually 
when blended down as per contract will result in about 310t of 4.4% LEU, which 
equates to about 1.8ktSWU and about 21ktU308 (Knapic & Dizard 1993c: 1,19). 
In other words, the minimum HEU import into the US, at a cost of $232 million, 
is equivalent to the annual LEU, and therefore SWU, requirements of about 20 
reactors, while the U308 content approximates half the present global demand. 
It is not clear what USEC will do with all the excess uranium, though the 
possibility has been raised of selling it to Japan as a strategic uranium reserve to 
prevent use of plutonium by that country. 
The worst scenario for nuclear fuel price recovery would be the maintainance of 
the status quo in the CIS: 'a situation where uranium is one of the few hard 
currency earners for the exSoviets and the Soviet economy continues to stumble, 
but for Western political reasons trade continues to be encouraged with the Soviet 
Union' (Combs 1991: 2-6). In this regard it is interesting to note that in 1992 Russia 
offered to pay Korea interest on loans with enriched uranium. In the near to 
medium-term future, it is unlikely that there will be an easing of the economic 
pressures on the newly emerging suppliers to keep their prices low in order to 
maximize turnover, and so even if demand begins to pick up, and inventories 
drop, uranium and nuclear fuel prices are unlikely to improve soon. 
Finally, although there appears to be little public discussion of the fate of US-ori-
gin HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons, there can be no doubt that the 
amounts involved will be similar to those being generated in the CIS. One recent 
report indicates that up to 40tHEU may be supplied to the USEC in an attempt to 
balance the importation of Russian HEU (Knapic & Dizard 1993c). This issue, 
however, is very new to the market, and is surrounded by a spectrum of political 
considerations that make it difficult to anticipate the market impact of US HEU. 
Although the economic pressures in the US are not likely to result in pressure to 
liquidi:£e military surplus uranium, there may well be individual interest groups 
in that country who will press for the release of such materials. /\nd if US HEU 
enters the market, the apple cart will be even more upset. 
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3.4.4 Summary 
Ever since the early nineteen eighties, the international uranium and nuclear fuel 
market has been in decline. Production of natural uranium as well as prices for 
U308, and for conversion and enrichment services have reached historical lows. 
With the decline has come a major restructuring of the market. There has been a 
very strong shift away from the one-stop nuclear fuel supplier toward traders in 
natural uranium, conversion or enrichment services, who obtain their products 
on a spot market. for example, more than half global U308 requirements are 
now apparently being obtained on the international spot market. In line with this 
shift, price formation has become less dependent on production costs. This trend 
is likely to increase as non-traditional suppliers- specifically Russia and the CIS 
states- gain bigger market shares, since for many of these production costs are 
not easily quantified and they have large historical inventories: their pricing 
policies will therefore be largely determined by spot market prices. 
New production of U308 fell below annual demand in 1986, but the market has 
since been fueled from inventories built up in the 1970s and early 1980s. These 
inventories are large: in the West they are about 153ktU (UJ 1992 Update), while 
conservative estimates put those in the East anywhere between 140 and 200ktU. 
In total, civilian inventory may be as high six to eight times global annual demand. 
The unknown Russian stockpile has unsettled the market, while TEN EX 's ability 
to produce SWU at very low prices has undermined it. In addition, with the 
global political changes of the last few years, uranium and HEU from military 
inventory and/or dismantled nuclear weapons is becoming available to the 
market. A contract between the US and Russia will see at least lOtHEU decon-
centrated per year out of SOOt covered by the contract. This amount of HEU 
contains the equivalent of about half the annual global uranium requirement, and 
in terms of SWU and LEU it corresponds to at least twenty annual reactor loads 
r -in a world with about 400 reactors. 
While industry analysts predict small rises in the market, their predictions have 
in the past been over optimistic about the likely expansion of the global nuclear 
industry. The expected increases in nuclear generating capacity are all predicted 
for countries in which there is little or no effective opposition to nuclear power; 
countries with effective opposition are forecast to show no growth, or small 
negative growth in the industry. In any event, all analyses agree that conversion, 
enrichment, and fuel fabrication capacity for the next fifteen to twenty years will 
outstrip demand by as much as 70 or 80%. 
3.5 The AEC's Nuclear Fuel Production division 
3.5.1 Production costs and prices 
The Nuclear fuel Production (NfP) division of the AEC is responsible for oper-
ating and maintaining the conversion, enrichment (Z-) and fuel fabrication 
(BEVA) plants, as well as the Yaalputs installation, and earth and environmental 
technologies. In addition, it seems NFP is also responsible for the AEC' s uranium 
stockpile. The environmental aspects of this division were not investigated as part 
of this report. Capital expenditures on the NFP plants as reflected in the AEC's 
books are given in Table 3.4. In estimating the 1992 amounts, it was assumed that 
the book value supplied by the AEC was current in the last year of construction 
of each plant. 
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Table 3.4 Capital expenditure on NFP plants. Values are given in Rm. 
CAP EX Year8 1992 Randsb 
Conversion 55.200 1985 122.030 
Z-Piant 785.000 1987 1 383.438 
BEVA 267.500 1985 591.357 
Y-Piant 210.000 1977 877.222 
8 Year re1ers to the last year o1 construct ion , and is assumed to be the year in which the 
indicated CAPEX 1igures appeared on the books o1 the AEC. 
b ln11ation rate assumed to be 10% 1or 1977-92, and 12% 1or 1985-92 period. 
Before discussing the present NFP activities, a brief mention of the historical cost 
of the pilot enrichment (Y-) plant must be made. As shown in the table above, the 
original capital investment was R210m, and annual operating costs have been 
reported as R40m (Venter 1993a). Construction of the plant began in 1971, but 
first production occurred only in 1979. Eight years is a long time for construction 
and commissioning of a small pilot plant, and it seems fair to assume that, for at 
least part of this time, operating expenses were already being incurred as com-
missioning proceeded. Accordingly, if one assumes that the annual operating 
expenditure commenced in 1975, and continued until decommissioning in 1989, 
then production costs for this period must have amounted to at least R560m, 
which , added to the original CAPEX, yields a total cost of R770m (in current 
rands) . (Not included in this total is the R18m cost of decommissioning the 
Y-plant.) These figures should be contrasted to the AEC's claims to have contrib-
uted R682m to the development of the nuclear 'devices', 83% of which (R566m) 
allegedly constituted the cost of theY-plant (Ryan 1993) . 
In the following discussion of production and operating costs for NfP activities, 
the above capital expenditures have been ignored, except where an attempt has 
been made to indicate the extent by which the estimated production costs would 
have to be scaled upwards, in order to recoup the amounts invested in the plant 
through sales of nuclear fuel. All the NfP data used here were supplied to this 
investigation by the AEC on the understanding that they represent grossly 
averaged figures. It seems fair to assume that if there is any bias in the data, it 
would probably reflect positively on the AEC, rather than negatively. In this 
sense, the estimates derived below may be assumed to reflect minimum costs (or 
maximum income), with the proviso that the estimates are very approximate ones. 
Table 3.5 outlines the proportion of the annual NFP budgets spent on its various 
services since the formation of the NFP as a separate accounting division within 
theAEC. 
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Table 3.5 Breakdown of annual NFP operating expenditure for the different 
NFP services. All figures are in millions of current rands. SUM represents the sum 
of the individual services, while NFP OE indicates the total NFP operating 
expenditure (excluding depreciation) as given in the global AEC flow of funds table 
(see Table 2.3). (Source: P. Venter & A. Vermaak, AEC) 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95-98 
Conversion 19.592 21.301 24.624 21 .034 20.542 24.800 27.275 104.346 
Enrichment 81 .893 170.209 171.089 183.200 233.969 213.504 141.204 268.462 
BEVA 62.440 75.136 50.448 46.531 47.209 46.957 49.738 183.436 
Decommission 10.7548 7.2738 40.000t 
Vaalputs 1.600 3.382 3.398 3.197 3.160 3.424 3.425c 13.698d 
SUM 165.525 270.028 249.559 264.716 312.153 288.685 221.897 610.964 
NFPOE 332.699 325.867 287.207 285.378 253.421 253.343 798.176 
8 Cost of decommissioning pilot enrichment (Y-) plant. 
b The minimum cost of decommissioning the semi-commercial (Z-) enrichment plant is 
estimated at R80m. 
c This figure is the average annua I cost based on the tota I projected cost (A 13.698 m) for 
the period 1994-97. 
d This figure is the projected total cost for 1994-97. 
In the following analysis of production costs in the NFP division, only those 
operating expenditures explicitly listed by the AEC for conversion, enrichment, 
fabrication, Vaal puts, and decommissioning were used; as can be seen from Table 
3.5, however, the actual NFP budget is in some cases considerably higher than 
the sum of the individual operating expenditures. This difference is partly ascrib-
able to additional services that NFP renders, which the division does not consider 
part of either conversion, enrichment, fabrication, Vaal puts or decommissioning. 
It is possible that opinions may differ on whether some of these additional 
services should not, in fact, be included, with the result that the operating 
expenditures listed in Table 3.5 would be higher. 
Table 3.6lists annual volumes produced by the NFP division, as well as percent-
age utilization of capacity. In calculating the utilisation, the following capacities 
were assumed (Venter 1993a): conversion plant (1200tU/yr), Z-plant 
(275tSWU/yr), BEVA plant (lOOtU/yr). Table 3.7 gives the income generated 
from sales in these sectors· · 
Table 3.6 Annual production from NFP division. (Source: P. Venter, AEC) 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95-98 
Conversion (tU) 91 383 428 160 678 525 625 2224 
% Utilization 8 32 36 13 57 44 52 46 
Enrichment (tS'NU) 23 165 77 189 243 250 500 
% Utilization 
8 60 28 69 88 91 1308 BEVA (tU)b 
% Utilization 1.81 17.62 25.31 29.37 25.31 20.79 18.98 90.38 
2 18 25 29 25 21 19 23 
a Calculated assuming that the Z-plant will cease production on 31 March 1996, as per the 
AEC's recommendations to the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs. 
b These amounts were calculated from the number of fuel assemblies listed for the 
respective years, assuming an amount of 451 .9kgU/assembly. 
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Table 3.7 NFP income for various services. Figures are given in millions of 
rands. (Source : P. Venter & A. Vermaak, AEC) 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Conversion 1.761 2.917 3.752 6.886 9.786 8.442 11 .367 
Enrichment 1.265 52.628 74.790 60.052 67.921 67.814 66.550 
BEVA 0.085 9.293 32.099 32.367 19.973 21.613 18.446 
Vaa lputs 1.600 3.523 3.540 3.330 3.362 3.689 3.6808 Uranium Sa les 
8.805 15.403 
Turnover 4.711 68.361 114.18 102.635 101.042 110.363 115.446 
a Th is f igure is the average annual income based on the total projected income 
(R14.720m) for the period 1994-97. 








Even a cursory examination of the data presented in the above tables reveals that 
with the exception of the Vaalputs facility, all the NFP services listed have been 
operated unprofitably, with expenditure outstripping income. Table 3.8 gives the 
average unit production cost for the years 1988-92 and 1988-93, the average price 
obtained per unit for the period 1988-93, (excluding obvious outliers) as well as 
the average spot market price for conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication 
services during those periods. Unit production costs were calculated by averag-
ing the annual production costs, which were established by dividing annual 
operating expenditure for each sector by the volume produced. It is possible that 
the volumes produced refer to the calendar year (1/1 - 31/12), whereas the 
operating expenditures listed refer to the financial year (1/4- 31/3), so that 
production costs may not be accurate. However, by averaging out the annual 
production costs, the error inherent in this approach is likely to be minimized. 
finally , because the operating expenditures listed in Table 3.5 arguably may not 
include all costs incurred in operating the plants, the estimates in Table 3.8 are 
likely to represent bare-bones estimates, and the true costs may actually be higher. 
Average AEC prices were calculated by averaging the annual prices, which in 
tum were established by dividing annual income for each sector by volume 
produced. Inherent in this approach to estimating prices is the assumption that 
inventory levels remained constant, that is, each unit produced was also sold. If 
sales were lower than the volumes produced, then the average prices obtained 
would clearly be higher than those indicated in Table 3.8; these prices, therefore, 
represent the absolute minimum that the AEC is likely to have obtained for 
conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication services during the years 1988-93. 
Also listed in Table 3.8 is a rough estimate of the additional unit production cost 
if the capital investment in each plant were to be recouped during the (assumed) 
ten year life-span of the plant. This estimate for depreciation of the plant is 
included here in order to remind the reader that in a truly commercial operation 
these costs would also need to be considered. 
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Table 3.8 NFP unit production cost and price. 
Conversion Enrichment Fuel Fabrication 
(R/kgU) (R/SWU) (R/kgU) 
NFP Production Cost (88-92) 98 3014 8848 
NFP Production Cost (88-93) 90 2587 7750 
AEC Price obtained (88-93) 18 466 1050 
Spot Price (88-92)8 9.32 156.90 11 oob 
Spot price (June 93)c 15.51 224 1100 
AEC Price 1993d 24 619 1394 
AEC Production Cost 19938 47 879 2259 
Depreciation1 23 559 2365 
Total AEC Cost9 70 1438 4624 
8 Averaged spot price for 1988-mid1993, converted into SA Rand at 2.5 ZAR/US$. 
b No spot market for fabrication exists; this value is the approximate going rate according 
to the Nuclear Fuel Procurement Manager at Eskom. 
c Spot price for June 1993, converted at rate 3.30ZAR/US$. 
d Calculated assuming that the average price obtained for 1988-1993 will be maintained, 
and adjusting this for inflation (12%) over an average 2.5 years. 
8 Cost of production in 1993, established by dividing operating expenditure for 1993 by 
volume produced. These figures are probably lower than the real costs, owing to the 
problem of non-overlapping production (1/1/93- 31/12/93) and financial years 
(1/4/93- 31/3/94). 
1 Calculated assuming a ten year plant life, CAPEX as indicated in Table 3.4 in 1992 rands, 
and average utilizations of 45% (conversion plant), 90% (Z-plant), and 25% (BEVA), with 
maximum annual capacities as indicated in the text. 
9 AEC production cost 1993 + depreciation. 
The average cost of production in each sector varies widely from year to year, as 
shown in figure 3.4. for all three sectors, costs in the first year of production were 
astronomical: R215/kgU for conversion (1988); R7 400/SWU for enrichment 
(1989); and R34 535/kgU for fuel fabrication (1988). On average, production costs 
for the period 1988-92 were between 8 and almost 20 times higher than the 
international spot market price. Costs have since dropped, but even now are still 
between two and four times higher than the spot price, and this despite the 
weakening of the rand against the dollar (which inflates the spot prices). AEC and 
Eskom officials have claimed that part of the reason production costs are so high, 
is that the plants are underutilised (see Table 3.6). This may be true for the 
conversion and BEVA plants which had average utilizations of 45 and 23%, 
respectively, if one excludes abnormally unproductive years. However, consid-
ering the size of the differential between the historic operating costs of both plants 
and the level of the spot price this assumption must surely be questioned. Even 
when the simplistic estimates of 1993 production costs- which are likely to be too 
low (see note e in Table 3.8)- are compared with spot prices in mid 1993, a gloomy 
picture emerges: for conversion, costs are still three times higher than spot, for 
fabrication they are about double the price offered at Westinghouse or Siemens. 
And if the original capital investment were to be recouped through fuel sales, the 
true production cost would be even higher. 
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FIGURE 3.2 Annual production costs. 
3.5.2 The Z-plant 
In the case of the Z-plant, the AEC acknowledges that the plant can never be 
operated profitably, even though its average utilisation has been a reasonable 
68%, and in recent years even appears to have been above 85%. Part of the reason 
for this is its extreme inefficiency. In its 1990 Review, the AEC reported an 
operating efficiency of 105 MWyr/100tSWU, which converts to 
9 200 kWhr /SWU, whereas the design intensity of the plant was reported as 
66 MWyr/100tSWU (5 800 kWhr/SWU). Neither of these values compares fa-
vourably even with the average 2 500 kWhr /SWU intensity quoted (Eerkens 
1989: 48) for diffusion plants, which are acknowledged to be totally uncompetitive 
by comparison with centrifuge plants. Assuming an improvement in efficiency 
to 85 MWyr/100tSWU (7 450 kWhr/SWU) fr'om the value quoted in 1990, it is 
possible to estimate the electricity bill that this plant alone would incur if it were 
billed by Eskom at the (cheapest) rate (tariff E) for large-scale, off-peak consum-
ers, ie, R0.0538/kWhr plus a demand charge of R26.89/kV A: 
assuming full production of 275tSWU/yr, the energy bill would be 
7450kWhr /SWU x 275 OOOSWU x RO.OS38/kWhr = R110 millon; 
assuming an average demand of 180MW or 180MV A, the demand charge would 
be 
180 x 103kVA x R26.89 / kVA = R55 million. 
The total annual bill would therefore be about Rl65m. It seems self-evident that 
Eskom is supplying electricity at substantially lower rates than this, since the total 
operating expenses for the plant are only slightly above this value, but Eskom 
officials have not released data on the pricing compact reached with the AEC, 
which possibly includes a swap of SWU for electricity. Considering the enormous 
subsidies that are necessary to keep the Z-plant operating, the question needs to 
be asked why the AEC has recommended to the Minister of Mineral and Energy 
Affairs that the plant be kept operational until 31 March 1996, instead of it being 
closed down forthwith. The AEC argues that (i) there would be a 'domino-effect' 
on other operations at the AEC if the plant were closed; (ii) some core competen-
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cies, such as Uf-6-handling technology, are dependent on the Z-plant; (iii) closure 
might affect MUS prospects; and (iv) there are contractual obligations to Eskom 
that need to be filled. 
That there would be a domino-effect following the closing of the Z-plant is 
undoubtedly true; this is always the case when an industrial plant closes down, 
but by postponing the closure the effect does not disappear - instead it is only 
pushed into the future, in this case at enormous cost. Secondly, the argument that 
some competencies, especially the technology for Uf-6 gas, may be dependent on 
the plant seems implausible, since the plant has now been operating for close on 
six years on the basis of technologies that to a large extent had already been 
mastered prior to its commissioning. For example, the experience gained with the 
handling of UF6 gas contributed greatly to the decision taken in 1983 to develop 
the MUS method. Moreover, it also seems improbable that the AEC would 
operate the Z-plant as an experimental station on the basis of as-yet poorly 
understood technologies; it is most likely that the technologies employed in this 
plant are fully matured and understood, and their transfer to other areas should 
not be dependent on continued experience with the Z-plant. The possible nega-
tive effect of closure on the MUS programme does not seem a very persuasive 
argument either, since the MUS process employs radically new kinds of technolo-
gies - this is the whole point of the MUS programme - and intersects with the 
operation of the Z-plant only at the level of the common Uf-6 feed . 
Finally, the argument concerning contractual obligations to Eskom is disingenu-
ous, since these contracts have obliged the utility to purchase nuclear fuel services 
from the AEC at super-premium prices, when they could have been procured on 
the spot market for a fraction of the price. During the years 1989-93 AEC sales to 
Eskom totalled at least R430m (Venter 1993a), or 89% of the NfP income. By 
taking the average AEC:spot price ratio as 1.95 (for both conversion and enrich-
ment) for the period 1988-92, we can estimate that Eskom in effect subsidised the 
NfP division of the AEC by at least R220m over the period 1989-93, or about 
R44m/yr. This estimate of the annual premium paid by Eskom for fuel from the 
AEC is remarkebly close to the R40m/yr additional cost claimed by the Parlia-
mentarian R. Hulley, as reported in the Sunday Times (3/10/93). Moreover, the 
. approximate prices established in this report for NfP products (see Table 3.8), 
specifically for SWU (1993: R619/SWU), compare well with those claimed by 
undisclosed (but apparently knowledgeable) sources in an article in the Sunday 
Times on 21/2/93, where it was reported that Eskom paid US$200/SWU to the 
AEC. These costs, of course, have been passed on to the consumer of (Koeberg) 
electricity. 
Since these services could have been obtained elsewhere at a fraction of the cost 
to Eskom, it is likely that the strategic imperatives that dictated energy policy in 
the past still have influence. Indeed, the Eskom Nuclear Fuel Procurement 
Manager has spoken of 'awkward' inherited contracts. However, it is surprising 
that Eskom continues to contract with the AEC now that these imperatives no 
longer apply and considering that the contracts come up for re-negotiation every 
year. Yet it does, albeit for smaller amounts than before: the AEC projects that 
Eskom will purchase services of the order of R48.379m during 1994, and 
R222.420m during 1995-98 (Venter 1993a), while Eskom admits that it will con-
tinue to contract the AEC for conversion, enrichment and fabrication services for 
a value of R74m/yr, or R296m during 1995-98 (Woodcock 1993) It is not clear how 
to account for the difference between the J\EC and the Eskom figures, but 
considering these revelations about the relationship between the two, Eskom's 
refusal to supply even averaged data regarding its purchases from the J\EC can 
be more easily understood. In this regard it is perhaps also useful to point out 
that the chairman of Eskom, Dr. I. McRae, has also been a long-standing member 
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of the AEC board. Needless to say, the additional costs incurred by Eskom as a 
result of its fuel procurement policies will be passed on to the consumer. 
In light of the above analysis of NFP performance, the claim published in the AEC 
1992 Annual Report that 'the AEC has succeeded in fulfilling its contractual 
obligations economically' has to be questioned. 
3.5.3 Reliability of data 
Lastly, it is neces~ry to comment on the reliability of the data supplied by the 
AEC. There is no way of knowing whether these data give an accurate reflection 
of the state of affairs in NFP, but some internal inconsistencies were noted, that 
suggest either opaque accounting methods within the AEC, or inaccurate data: 
1 Two graphs in the AEC 1992 Annual Report seem to suggest that by the end 
of 1991 cumulative production for the last three quarters of that year stood at 
about 215tU (320tUF6) from the conversion plant, and about 138tSWU from 
the Z-plant, whereas the data supplied to this report suggest that only 160tU 
were processed and 77tSWU produced during the entire year. 
2 The AEC 1988 Review mentions that 287tU (425tUF6) were converted during 
that year, while the data supplied to this report indicate production of only 
91 tU. (This discrepancy may be related to the difference between the financial 
and the production year, although the 1990 Review reflects exactly the same 
amount of converted uranium - 428tU -as do the data supplied here.) And 
in a paper presented in Washington in June 1993, P. Venter, Executive General 
Manager of NFP, claims that 734tSWU were produced from 1988 to 'date' 
(mid 1993) (Venter 1993b). According to the information supplied to this 
report, the total amount of SWU produced by end of 1992 was 454t, and by 
end of 1993 would be 697t. 
3.5.4 NFP future plans 
In the long term, depending on the success of its MUS programme, the NFP 
division would like to set itself up as a one-stop nuclear fuel supplier, while in 
the short term 'the AEC has set firm goals for obtaining some near-term c~:mtracts 
in specific niches within the conversion and enrichment markets' (Venter 1993b). 
The AEC harbours these plans despite the acknowledged 'somewhat less than 
attractive trade conditions' in the international nuclear fuel market. However, 
given the dismal situation that exists with respect to production costs of the 
conversion, Z-, and BEY A plants, the AEC does not seem well-positioned to break 
into this market without substantial and consistent subsidisation by the state. 
For instance, the AEC claims to have exported about 37tSWU (5% of production) 
and 340tU as UF6 (20%), (Venter 1993b) and claims an income of Rl3.754m from 
these exports. At the average prices listed in Table 3.8 these amounts should have 
generated about R17.242m and R6.120m, respectively, giving a total income of 
R23.362m. Since the actual reported income from exports is lower, the conclusion 
must be either that the income from the exported products has not been fully 
tabled, or that the products were sold at prices that were considerably cheaper 
than those charged to Eskom. The latter is the more likely conclusion, since there 
does not appear to be any reason why non-South African consumers would be 
willing to pay the premium prices that the AEC has been obtaining from Eskom; 
the AEC must therefore have been charging more realistic prices abroad. Indeed, 
at presumed spot prices of R215/SWU and R15/kgU, the amounts allegedly 
exported would generate R13.055m (= R7.995m + RS.lOOm), a sum very close to 
the claimed income from exports. This means that production must have been 
even more heavily subsidised than was the case with Eskom! It also means that 
the estimated R222.420m premium which Eskom has paid to the 1\EC is probably 
an underestimate. In summary, it does not seem plausible to assume that the 1\EC 
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will be able to offer prices for any of the NFP products that are simultaneously 
internationally competitive, while at least covering production costs. (The ques-
tion, therefore, is whether the AEC should continue to be subsidised in order to 
produce products that are exorbitantly expensive in rand terms, in order to earn 
some foreign exchange.] 
Another export order, for 40 573SWU, mentioned in the 1993 Annual Report, was 
in fact placed with the AEC by Nufcor, and does not represent an international 
marketing success by the AEC itself. Nufcor earned R5.458m from this order, 
which implies that Nufcor charged its overseas client a bargain-basement price 
of R134.52/SWU, less than a third of the average price Eskom paid during the 
years 1988-92. It is likely that the AEC will have sold the SWU at less than 
R134/SWU. Other such super-discount arrangements between Nufcor and the 
AEC have also been reported. One 1992 contract to supply 320tU as UF6 earned 
Nufcor R31.124m, while two in 1993 for 32 and 37tU as UF6 respectively generated 
R2.106m and R4.924m. These amounts translate into R97.41, R65.80, and 
R132.64/kgU as UF6. Although these values fall into the range of the spot market 
prices in 1992/93, they are much lower than the average price of R157.90/kgU 
that Nufcor obtained for unconverted U308 during 1992. This implies that the 
charges for conversion must have been negligible, in order for Nufcor to be able 
to sell the converted UF6 at such discount prices. One could argue that these 
examples constitute aberrations, meant as sweeteners to Nufcor's international 
clients, but that does not do away with the point that AEC exports will always, 
by necessity, have to be subsidised by central government, and therefore by the 
taxpayer. 
Turning briefly to the NFP projections for the period 1994-98, it is interesting to 
note that the AEC expects to sell more SWU in the period 1995-98 than it would 
be capable of producing if plans to decommission the Z-plant by April 1996 are 
fulfilled. This would only be possible, if SWU are being stockpiled from unde-
clared excess production at present (-not likely, since the plant is already running 
at almost full capacity], or if SWU bought on the international market are to be 
resold at a small premium. In this case, the AEC would then be acting as a trader 
on the international nuclear fuel market- a role that it has not traditionally played 
-and one that a state-subsidized organization is perhaps not best placed to fulfill. 
The AEC's long-term plans for becoming a one-stop nuclear fuel supplier are also 
highly problematic, not the least because they fly in the face of the historic trend 
away from one-stop suppliers toward brokers and traders. (In fact, one could 
argue that were it not for its long years of protection as the only fuel supplier in 
South Africa, the AEC would not entertain such plans.] Even if the MUS pro-
gramme turns out to be a success, there will be a lag of at least six years between 
the closure of the Z-plant and the possible future opening of a commercial MUS 
plant. During this time the AEC will not be able to supply SWU - whatever 
customers they attract by 1995 will almost certainly be lost to them during that 
time. This means that re-entry into the market in about 2003/5 will be extremely 
difficult, since the AEC will have little or no market history or reputation to judge 
it by: consumers would not know how reliable a supplier the AEC is likely to be, 
nor would they be able to estimate the quality of its products. In addition, by the 
turn of the century the US Enrichment Corporation will be well on its way to 
privatisation, possibly making a new entry onto the market that much more 
difficult. Finally, the likely overcapacity in the enrichment market for the foresee-
able future will not make a penetration by the AEC any easier. 
3.5.5 Summary 
The NFP division of the AEC has been burdened with conversion, enrichment, 
and fuel fabrication plants that have demanded totally uneconomic production 
costs. Even ignoring the capital investments originally made in the plants, pro-
duction costs have been up to twenty times higher than international market 
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prices. In the case of the conversion and fabrication plants, the AEC maintains 
that the major reason for their uneconomic performance is the low utilisation rate. 
But the historic production costs have been so high, that this argument does not 
immediately seem plausible. As far as the Z-plant is concerned, the AEC admits 
that the plant can never perform economically, but maintains that its continued 
operation (until at least April1996) is important for a number of other activities 
at Pelindaba. When examined more closely, these arguments do not appear very 
persuasive, however. Only in the case of the Vaalputs facility is the NfP turning 
in a profit. 
The AEC has not been able to recover the full costs of production from the 
products sold to Eskom, but it has nevertheless been able to hold Eskom to 
contracts in terms of which the utility has been paying up to three times what it 
would have to, if it had been free to procure its requirements on the international 
market. Despite having to pay high premiums for fuel from the AEC, Eskom 
continues to contract to the AEC for reasons that can only be surmised. It seems 
reasonable to assume that these premiums are passed on as additional costs borne 
by the consumer of electricity. 
While Eskom has been paying premiums for AEC services, Nufcor has been 
obtaining discounts for converted or enriched Uf6 that it has exported. Some of 
these export orders obtained by Nufcor have appeared in AEC Annual Reports 
as export orders placed with the AEC, thereby creating the impression that the 
AEC is active on the international fuel market. While the AEC is known to have 
independently completed a deal on this market, this is a recent development. 
In the long-term, the AEC hopes to set itself up as a one-stop nuclear fuel supplier, 
but in the near-term its plans for the 1994-98 period seem to suggest that it intends 
to act as a trader on this market. Considering the long years of (allegedly) little 
or no contact with the outside nuclear world , the AEC's experience on this market 
is likely to be Jimi ted, and its chances of success as a trader accordingly seem slim. 
Even if the MUS programme is successful, the lag between the decommissioning 
of the Z-plant and the commissioning of a commercial MUS plant will make it 
very unlikely that the /\EC will be able to penetrate an already very competitive 
market, especially since it will have little or no market history. 
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3.6 The Nuclear Fuels Corporation {Nufcor) 
Nufcor is the Chamber of Mines uranium marketing organisation. Its ownership 
alters from year to year, since the uranium-producing mining houses own shares 
in it in proportion to the amount of uranium they produce. Uranium-producing 
mines supply ammonium diuranate slurries to Nufcor's plant near Johannesburg, 
where they are blended and calcined into exportable concentrates containing 
U308. The plant employs about forty people, while the head office in Johannes-
burg has a staff of eight which market uranium mainly to utilities in Europe, 
North America, and the Far East. Nufcor has been marketing South African 
uranium abroad since its formation in 1967, and according to data supplied 
undertook its first local delivery in 1980 (Scorer 1993) . By the end of 1992 Nufcor 
had exported 89.956ktU out of a total production of 94.184ktU, generating an 
income of R6 498m. In addition, 4.774ktU had been delivered locally for a rand 
value of R607.317m. Of the total volume produced, 855tU are unaccounted for in 
the data supplied by Nufcor; possibly this amount constitutes inventory held by 
Nufcor. 
South African uranium production has followed international trends fairly 
closely, peaking in 1980 at 6 028tU, constituting 13.6% of uranium produced by 
WOCA countries during that year. Since the mid-eighties, however, SA produc-
tion has declined faster than WOCA production, so that in 1991 SA production 
(1601tU) constituted just less than 6%. Figure 3.3 depicts SA uranium production 
as a function of WOCA production for the period 1970-91, while Figure 3.4 
illustrates the performance of Nufcor prices for exported and locally delivered 
uranium in relation to the international spot market price. The data for the latter 
graph were calculated using averaged, annual historical ZAR:US$ exchange rates 
supplied by the Standard Bank of S/\, but the rates used for the years prior to 1978 
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FIGURE 3.3 SA and WOCA uranium production. 
(Source: Nufcor & Uranium Institute) 
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FIGURE 3.4 Nufcor prices. Local delivery of uranium only commenced in 1980, 
according to Nufcor data. Prices are in current rands. 
(Source: Nufcor & Uranium Institute) 
Figure 3.4 suggests that Nufcor largely failed to capitalise on the uranium boom 
of 1973-79, its prices only reaching parity with spot in 1979. Since then, Nufcor 
export prices have remained marginally above spot, except for the years 86/87, 
when its prices dipped below spot, perhaps as a result of an initial panic reaction 
to the imposition of comprehensive anti-Apartheid sanctions in the US. While its 
performance in the export market has been fairly erratic, Nufcor has performed 
consistently and remarkably well on its locally delivered product, managing to 
persuade local consumers to pay premium prices for home-grown product. Thus, 
during the years 1980-92 the price of locally delivered U308 was on average 71% 
higher than spot, and 38% higher than the export price. Since there would not 
appear to be any local consumers of large U308 quantities other than Eskom and 
possibly the AEC, it is fair to conclude that Eskom must have been paying Nufcor 
at the premium rate estimated above. Bearing in mind the discounted prices 
offered to Nufcor by the AEC -as discussed in Section 3.5.4 - it is furthermore 
fair to assume that Nufcor will have reciprocated by supplying the AEC with 
uranium at prices that do not approach those paid by Eskom. This means that the 
average 38% increment on the cost to overseas clients, or the 71% increment over 
the spot price, represent minimum premiums paid by Eskom, with the real prices 
perhaps being significantly higher than this. 
Since Eskom has been extremely reticent about communicating its nuclear fuel 
requirements or purchases, it is impossible to estimate with any degree of 
accuracy the quantities that Eskom will have purchased from Nufcor over the 
past decade. Considering the differential between Nufcor's export prices and 
those obtained for local delivery, it would certainly appear, however, that Eskom 
overpaid not only for NFP services from the AEC, but also for uranium supplied 
by Nufcor. Again, it is unlikely that the real reasons for this unusual procurement 
policy will become public knowledge. What is certain, however, is that the 
privately-owned mining houses profited from this arrangement between one of 
their businesses and a statal or parastatal corporation. The costs of this arrange-
ment were most likely borne by electricity consumers. 






SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The NFP division of the AEC generates income of about R90m/yr, R80m of which 
accrues from contracts with Eskom. These agreements oblige the utility to pur-
chase fuel from the AEC at prices that are inflated by about R40m/yr over what 
Eskom would have to pay for the same products on the international spot market. 
An additional income of R13m was generated in 1992/3 and 1993/4 from a 
contract to supply Nufcor with products for export. In order to produce this 
income, the NFP division requires annual operating expenditure of about 
R280m/yr. 
The major reason for the NFP division's apparent economic unviability is the 
huge operating costs that its conversion, Z- and BEVA plants demand. The AEC's 
own figures reveal that the average production costs at the conversion, enrich-
ment, and fabrication plants during the period 1988-92 were between 10 and 20 
times the spot market price during the same period, and this excludes the capital 
costs of the various plants. In the case of the conversion and BEY A plants, it is 
claimed that the main reason for these high operating costs is their underutilisa-
tion. While this may be the case for these plants, it certainly is not so for the 
Z-plant, which the AEC admits will never be viable. However, the corporation 
argues that for a number of reasons the plant should not be closed down yet. On 
closer scrutiny, these arguments appear weak and opportunistic. 
In part, the AEC' s short-term hopes for survival in the nuclear fuel market appear 
to involve plans to trade in SWU on the international market, and to supply 
conversion and fabrication services to this market. This market is totally over-
traded at present and will continue to be so for at least the next decade, resulting 
in fierce competition. The AEC, having little or no experience in the market, is 
therefore unlikely to be successful in this endeavour. It can only enter the global 
nuclear fuel market as a trader by offering exceptionally low prices. Who, then, 
would be subsidising these prices? · 
In the long-term, the AEC hopes to survive in the market on the back of its MUS 
program. If the pilot MUS plant confirms the AEC's apparent belief that the 
process could be economically viable, the AEC hopes to find private investors for 
construction of a commercial MUS plant. The AEC may also be entertaining some 
hope of persuading a future government to support the venture. The AEC's 
claimed successes in its MUS R&D program cannot be verified independently 
owing to commercial secrecy surrounding all such programs. However, it seems 
implausible that with an outlay not exceeding US$100m, the AEC could have 
produced a technology that rivals or outdoes its A VUS and MUS competitors in 
other countries with scientific and technological infrastructures far more ad-
vanced than those in South Africa, and R&D budgets many orders of magnitude 
greater. 
This report has only been able to deal with the nuclear fuels aspects of the /\EC's 
future plans. A similar investigation of the PTP side of operations, which would 
assess the markets that the non-nuclear fuels products hope to penetrate, and 
estimate the AEC's ability to succeed in this, is required. 
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CHRONOLOGY OF NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1945 SA requested to investigate deposits of radium and pitchblende by UK 
government, in connection with the Manhattan project. 
1946 Formation of a Uranium Research Committee. 
1948 Promulgation of Atomic Energy Act setting up the AEB. 
1949 AEB created 1 January. 
1950 SA signs Heads of Agreement with UK-USA to supply all uranium for 
weapons. (Lasts, with amendments, until 1964.) 
1952 First full-scale uranium extraction plant at West Rand Consolidated mine. 
1956 Governor-General of the Union of SA appoints a Commission of Enquiry 
into the application of nuclear power in SA (Commission only reports 
back in 1961.) 
1957 IAEA established with participation of SA 
1959 National nuclear research program of the AEB approved by Cabinet. 
1961 Pelindaba established. 
Decision to investigate the vortex tube aerodynamic separation method, 
also known as the stationary wall centrifuge method. 
1964 Enrichment research begins. 
1965 SAfARl-1 commissioned. (Safeguard agreement with IAEA in 1967.) 
Minister of Mines and Planning asks AEB to investigate and report on the 
possible introduction of nuclear power in SA (Report in 1968 recommends 
a 350MW CANDU reactor would be viable in the Western Cape by 1978.) 
Separation of U235 from U238 first demonstrated. 
1967 Work on indigenous natural uranium, heavy-water moderated research 
reactor (Pelinduna or SAfARI-2) at Pelindaba halted. (Development com-
menced in 1962.) 
Uranium enrichment demonstrated locally at laboratory level. 
Nufcor established. 
Eskom purchases Duynefontein farm, future site for Koeberg. 
1969 Cabinet votes funds for pilot (Y) enrichment plant. 
W. Stumpf and others receive training at Gesellschaft fuer Kernforschung, 
Karlsruhe, Germany. 
1970 Prime Minister Vorster announces development of 'unique' vortex tube 
method. 
UCOR established in terms of the Uranium Enrichment Act (Act 33). 
1971 Minister of Mines approves short study of the potential for 'peaceful 
nuclear explosives'. 
Construction on pilot enrichment (Y) plant begins. 
1973 UCOR and STEAG (Germany) together undertake 'feasibility study' of 
enrichment processes. Some claim this was a smokescreen for collabora-
tion around the transfer of enrichment technology, although the AEC has 
always denied this. 
Construction of pilot conversion plant begins. 
1974 Prime Minister's ad hoc committee decides to construct a nuclear weapon. 
Decision to use pilot enrichment plant for production of HEU. 
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1975 First separate vote of funds (called 'shares') for UCOR. Prior to this UCOR 
funds were channelled through the AEB. 
Commissioning of pilot UF6 conversion plant. 
1976 Commercial UF6 production at Pelindaba commences.Production begins 
at Rossing mine, Namibia. 
Koeberg contract signed. (Safeguards agreement with IAEA in 1977.) 
US exports of nuclear fuel for SAFARI 1 denied. Prepayment for this fuel 
was returned by the Reagan administration in 1981. 
1977 AEB instructed to prepare plans for meeting ESKOM's future fuel require-
ments. Detection (by Soviet satelite) and subsequent dismantling of Kala-
hari test site. 
1978 Y-plant commissioned, first production. 
1979 Construction of 'semi-commercial' centrifuge enrichment plant (Z-plant) 
commences. Technology based on the Helikon technique, cascade design. 
(Completed in 1986.) 
First production from pilot conversion plant. 
Detection of (unexplained) double flash over South Atlantic by US spy 
satelite. 
1980 BEYA fuel fabrication plant construction begins at Pelindaba. 
Uranium production peaks at 6143tU. 
First fissile 'device' completed. 
Construction of BEY A (Brandstof element vervaardigings aanleg) plant 
begins. 
1981 First fuel elements produced by project ELPROD for SAFARI-1. 
1982 Nuclear Energy Act (Act 92) promulgated, in terms of which the AEB and 
UCOR are converted to companies- NUCOR (Pty.) Ltd. and UCOR (Pty.) 
Ltd., respectively - and the Atomic Energy Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. is 
established as their controlling body. 
Council for Nuclear Safety (CNS) established within AEC. 
ANC sabotages Koeberg NPS. 
Afrikander (primary uranium producer) lease closed. 
1983 Start of laser enrichment studies. Molecular laser isotope separation 
(MUS) technique chosen above atomic vapor laser isotope separation 
(A VLIS) mainly because of experience gained with UF6. 
1984 Koeberg 1 reaches criticality. 
Beisa section of St. Helena gold mines (only remaining primary uranium 
producer in SA) is closed due to depressed uranium market. 
1985 Koeberg 2 critical. 
Restructuring of AEC; NUCOR and UCOR are integrated under the AEC 
in terms of the Nuclear Energy Amendment Act. 
Exploration of Karoo Sequence for uranium is terminated due to slump in 
the uranium market. · 
Start of BEY A plant commissioning. 
Start of Z-plant commissioning. 
1986 First production at conversion plant. 
Vaalputs National Radioactive Waste Repository becomes operational. 
US sanctions against nuclear cooperation with SA are imposed. 
AEC announces plans for a nuclear research facility at Gouriqua, Southern 
Cape. (Speculation that this is to be a reprocessing facility.) 
AEC state subsidy peaks at 89% of the total vote for the Department of 
Mineral and Energy Affairs (R775m out of R87lm). 
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1987 AEC opens office in Gansbaai, Southern Cape, possible site for next NPS 
development. 
Development program for new enrichment plant initiated. This later leads 
to the decision to stop work on the centrifuge method, and concentrate on 
the development of a pilot MLIS plant. 
Agreement between ESKOM and the AEC on fuel supply. 
1988 First full production at Z-plant. 
Fuel fabrication (BEY A) plant goes on-line. 
The first four fuel assemplies are delivered to Koeberg. (Up to September 
1991 three full reloads will have been supplied.) 
CNS becomes independent, reporting to the Minister of Mineral and 
Energy Affairs. 
Pelindaba, Valindaba, and Vaalputs facilities are brought into the formal 
licensing process. 
US Senate fails to pass House of Representatives legislation designed to 
close loophole allowing SA uranium into the US. 
1989 First full reload for Koeberg of nuclear fuel elements locally produced. 
Six fissile 'devices' produced to date. 
Decision by ad hoc Cabinet to dismantle the devices. 
Pilot conversion plant decommissioned. 
1990 AEC adopts commercial strategy (AEC 2000-PLUS); plans to be inde-
pendent of state subsidy in 15 years. 
Closure and start of decommissioning procedure of Y -plant. 
1991 Closure of Zirconium production plant. 
Construction of pilot MLIS plant begun. Capacity 20 000 SWU /yr, but will 
only be operated continuously for short periods. 
Discontinuation of research into centrifuge enrichment. 
Hot cell complex at Pelindaba commissioned. (Safeguard agreement 
signed in 1987.) 
SA becomes signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 
reaches a safeguard agreement with the lAEA on all nuclear facilities. 
US embargo on SA uranium lifted. 
Start of phase-out of fusion research. 
1992 Planned completion of C02 laser test facility. 
First exports of enrichment services (37 000 SWU) and UF6 (340 000 kg) . 
1994 Proposed start of phase-out of Z-plant. (Minister of MEA or Cabinet will 
make the decision about closing the Z-plant.) 
1995 Planned completion of pilot MLIS enrichment plant. 
1996 Assessment of viability of commercial120 000 SWU/yr MLIS plant. 
Planned start of construction on commercial MLIS plant. (The civil works 
for the pilot plant were designed to accomodate the complete commercial 
plant in the same building.) 
1998 Temporary storage ponds for irradiated fuel at Koeberg are expected to be 
full. Transfer of unreprocessed spent fuel to Vaal puts? 
2003 Approximate planned phase-in of commercial MLIS plant. 
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